

Movables, he could not be performed without to have them stored in his Movables, ~~when they got two Thirds of the Lands that are due~~ Value the 10000. Msc's Desire for them 1. Feb. 1671 Pringle contra Pringle. One having for his and his son a young Boy and his son Granddaughter, later in fact destined to marry together, proposed set of the Conditions or Reservations after mentioned, his Lands to them & the Heirs. Male to be pre-empted of their Broods which failing to the Brother his nearest Heir. Male; which failing to the said Grandson in case of her surviving her own Heirs Male. Their Heirs and so reserving a Faculty to the Disponer to alter: The Boy was bound Right to the Half of his Mails and Dutys from the Disponer, & if incapable, till he should come to an age for marrying; reserving to consider the import of the Disposition in case ~~then~~ he should refuse to marry in the Terms thereof 2 January 1712. All such contra Heirs. Disponer. Because no Period of time being assigned for the Boy's Marriage, it must be understood in a rational Sense viz. When he should come to Maturity of lg. and a fit Habit of Body. And it is not thought, that the Disponer intended the Mails and Dutys to remain with his Heir until the Parties were capable to marry; But that they should enjoy *de medio tempore* for their Entertainment and Education.

By the civil Law Obligations or Contracts conceived under impossible Conditions are null. l. 31. ff. de oblig. & act. l. 7. ff. de verb. oblig. Because Persons accepting and taking Obligations under impossible condition are not to be serious in what they do. And in Scotland as Conditions are not to be serious in what they do. And in Scotland a Right affected with an impossible Condition conceived in suspensive Terms till such a Condition be purged is not truly conditional; but present void Stair l. 2. Tit. 3. §. 36. Because we are not to wait till a Thing happen which can never be; and the Parties who admit such a Condition are understood only to jest in the Matter. But impossible Conditions are not adjected, if the Right be conceived in resolutive or irritant Terms upon the not performing such Conditions or Provisions. However a Law was made to annul a particular impossible Condition in a Contract or Obligation, without irritating or making void the Obligation itself, viz a Parties Consent to a Charge for implementing his Obligation, upon fewer Days than it was possible for him to obey the Charge, was declared null, and the Creditor appointed to charge according to the Custom of the Realm Act 138. Nov. 12. J. 6. A Condition is impossible

impossible either de facto, or de jure. A Condition in p. 160. fact is that which naturally cannot come to pass, as if no one could be born with a Finger. A condition impossible de jure is contrary to Law and good Mann is such as a Condition for an Angel to Steal. Nam id tantum possumus, non possumus de jure et occasione homines menses. l. 105. ff. de resp. per l. 31. ff. de oblig. & l. 137. ff. de verb. oblig. l. 14. l. 15. ff. de cond. inst. & 24. Inst. 1. v. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1. Transf. in 1. v. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1. l. 14. l. 15. ff. de cond. inst. & 24. Inst. 1. v. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1. Should complete it &c. Blair Judic. §. 57. By sic h. i. l. 1. cap. 1. if a Woman co marry a certain honest Person & so & marries l. 63. §. 1. ff. de conc. & dem. & whereby she is restrained to a particular Person & by l. 64. pr. & co. Or co marry for him first. St. 1. cap. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1. l. 62. §. 2. ff. co. It is a Condition of a Woman co fulfil a certain Person in her Marriage l. 22. ff. co. Or she marry as such. If poor and have not to do l. 72. §. 4. ff. co. is lawful. But a Condition if it is not marry is unlawful. Which Conditions & straining Marriage, so restrain unlawfull only is to Virgins, are not as to Widows l. 11. cap. 1. lib. 1. v. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1.

The Sd. Stair (Inst. Lib. 1. Tit. 3. §. 7.) distinguishes between a Right granted by Parents to their Children upon Condition that they marry not or marry such Persons; and Rights oblige'd with such Conditions imposed by Strangers holding, that Conditions of that Kind imposed by the natural Father willing to provide for their Children, are not useful, as restraining the liberty of Marriage, which natural Affection oblige't them not to violate but that the like Conditions in Rights made by Strangers, must be implemented, otherwise the Right so qualified is ineffectual. But a Father having granted a Bond to his Daughter for an additional sum more than was provided to her in her Mother's Contract of Marriage upon her granting a Bond not to marry without his Consent and if she did that she should lose the said Addition. The Obligation in the such Bond was found effectual, as not contrary to the Freedom of Marriage, and the additional sum was found not to be due, she not having required her Father's Consent to her Marriage, albeit the Marriage was suitable 13 Feb. 1600. Buchanan contra L. Buchanan. A Clause in a Father's Bond of Provision w^t his Daughters, That they should proceed in all their Affairs with Advice of certain Friends, and in case they did transgres' or did not carry themselves worthily, the Bond is to those might be restricted by the Friends, and the Overplus applied to such of the other Daughters as they thought fit; was found to be just and valid. But it was not found transgres' by one of the Daughters marrying without these Friends Consent unless the Clause of the Bond had been known to her before her Contract of Marriage; and if it was known to her, the Friends were ordain'd to declare and instruct any relevant Reasons they had for denying their Consent 3 Decem 1600